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Faith, Philosophy and the Elemental  
Richard J. Colledge 
In recent popular debate concerning the relationship between religion and contemporary 
philosophy and the natural sciences, two pervasive tendencies can be identified, these 
being what might be called ‘incompatibilist’ and ‘assimilationist’ approaches.1 In what 
follows, I will maintain that neither of these is adequate to the task of seriously thinking 
through the relationship between rational-empirical and religious interpretations of the 
world.2 But further, drawing heavily on the work of Adriaan Peperzak, I will maintain 
that the crucial shortcoming of both approaches is that they fail to recognise the 
essentially derivative nature of both kinds of discourse, and their rootedness in something 
much more primal and basic; if also, by definition, something vastly more difficult to 
elaborate.  
 
Beyond Polarisation and Synthesis: Rethinking the Contemporary Debate  
Before proceeding, it will be helpful to map the terrain of much of the contemporary 
debate. The first (‘incompatibilist’) approach assumes a bipolar view of the relationship 
according to which a choice essentially needs to be made to affirm either reason or faith as 
fundamental. Accordingly, one must affirm either the primordiality of contemporary 
rationality and scientific empiricism over and above religious truth claims; or 
alternatively, to adopt a position of fundamental faithfulness to a religious orthodoxy 
whilst regarding philosophical and scientific methodologies and conclusions with 
caution or even suspicion.  
 
There are, of course, various shades of insistence with each position. In the case of 
rationalist incompatibilism, one might distinguish between more and less exclusivist 
tendencies. On one hand, there are those (e.g., de Botton 2012, Solomon 2006) who allow 
religious modes of discourse some level of legitimacy as aesthetic or ethical ways of 
speaking that can inspire us to act in positive ways or give us a sense of life meaning, but 
whose truth claims (in any realist sense) are to be largely (if usually politely) rejected. On 
the other hand, there are the advocates of a strongly ‘eliminativist’ bent (e.g., Grayling 
2013, Onfray 2005) and an array of other anti-religion campaigners with scientific or 
social-scientific credentials. For such thinkers, religious, superstitious and supernaturalist 
approaches are inimical to rational and even civilized thought, so much so that even 
                                                             
1 Note that the classificatory terms introduced in this first section are used descriptively with reference to 
the content matter of this essay. As such, they are not to be understood with reference to their usage in 
other familiar philosophical debates (e.g., incompatibilism with reference to the metaphysics of human 
freedom, or eliminativism with reference to physicalist accounts of mind).  
2 Space constraints preclude a more expansive typology of worldviews that have been lumped together 
here under the headings of “rational-empirical” approaches (by which I include both scientific and rational 
philosophical outlooks in their myriad varieties) and “religious” interpretations (in their equally diverse 
manifestations). However, given the contentions of the essay that seeks to challenge at least one important 
aspect by which these two approaches are so commonly opposed, little is lost in initially granting such a 
broad-brush (if, in itself inadequate) characterisation.  
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apparently ‘reasonable’ versions of religious thought need to unmasked and similarly 
discarded as the artefacts of pre-scientific barbarism that they nonetheless remain.  
 
Meanwhile, religiously-orientated incompatibilism remains alive and well. Admittedly, 
strong eliminativism is comparatively rare within contemporary intellectual debate, if by 
that is meant the rejection of rationality out of hand when it comes to matters of faith, 
including all exercises in theology and apologetics that look to make a systematic case for 
religious belief. Absolutist disjunctions between Athens and Jerusalem that would regard 
reasoned accounts of faith as impious, illegitimate and (since they commit the category 
error of attempting to understand eternal things with finite concepts) impossible, are now 
quite rare.  On the other hand, there are a large range of approaches that fit into what C. 
Stephen Evans (2008) has called “responsible fideism”, as opposed to “irrational fideism” 
of which Evans gives the example of Shestov (1966). In insisting on the primacy of faith 
over reason, such approaches paradoxically provide serious reasoned justifications for 
this very primacy by which faith transcends reason. In doing so, they look not to 
rationally justify faith-based truth claims (which can only ever be recognised in faith 
itself), but rather to demonstrate why reason is unable to satisfactorily deal with religious 
problems and truths, and why faith alone can do so. The Reformed Epistemology school 
provides an interesting variation of this approach in arguing for a conception of faith as 
“properly basic” and not in need of being inferred from anything more fundamental (e.g., 
Plantinga and Wolterstorff 1991).    
 
The second diverse group of approaches to negotiating the faith-reason divide – the 
assimilationist tendency – are those that look to argue not for the primacy of one over the 
other, but rather to affirm the equiprimordiality and/or complementarity (if not the 
complete unity) of both. Many versions to this assimilationist strategy can be identified. 
Putting to one side myriad efforts to unite pagan gnostic spiritualties with science of 
dubious quality, the focus here is on approaches that look to meld naturalism and 
religious thought, bringing faith and reason together in a higher synthesis by which the 
contingencies of both – understood as that which creates the illusion of polarisation – fall 
away, thus revealing a single vision of reality. The Process Theology of scholars such as 
David Ray Griffin (2004) and John Cobb (2007) is an example of this approach. (Such 
syntheses are to be distinguished from Hegel’s Aufhebung, Spinoza’s “true knowledge”, 
and other such approaches in which religion emerges as the poorer cousin, one step 
below absolute the knowing of philosophical science.) A second approach, developed 
most famously by Stephen J. Gould (1999), is the strategy of affirming both science and 
religion as independent “non-overlapping domains” or authoritative sources dealing 
with separate but equally important areas of human knowledge: on one hand the facts, 
and on the other hand meaning, value and purpose. Third, there are those who make use 
of philosophically sophisticated forms of argumentation, and/or the findings of recent 
scientific research, to build a case for the common trajectory of philosophy, science and 
religious traditions. Among this group, one might count the work of philosophical 
apologists such as William Lane Craig (2008) and Richard Swinburne (1993), and 
scientist/theologians such as John Polkinghorne (1993). Somewhat like the method of 
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Aquinas, this approach claims that there is a fundamental complementarity between 
reason and revelation, even if one cannot always simply be derived from the other.     
 
These are, of course, very broad brushstrokes, but I make them in order to demonstrate a 
striking point about much of the current debate. It is this. What lies so often unremarked 
upon is the assumption that rationality (however configured) and/or religious belief 
(however configured) are – either singularly or together – “properly basic” (to borrow 
Plantinga and Wolterstorff’s term). This is an assumption that cuts right across a vast 
range of theories, from evangelical theism to evangelical atheism. But this is not an 
assumption that need go unchallenged. Might it not be that the community between 
rationality and religious faith has roots that go deeper than either of them alone?  
 
In drawing on the work of Adriaan Peperzak and a series of other thinkers in the field, 
this paper argues not so much for the unity (of whatever kind) between faith and reason, 
but rather for their rootedness in a common pre-conceptual soil from which both spring. 
Rather than focusing on teleological attempts to do justice to both via synthesising them, 
I suggest that much more might be gained by allowing them to retain their 
distinctiveness even while developing an archaeological account of their common source in 
pre-rational and pre-religious soil. Of course, given this common source, elements of 
convergence among the fruits of each plant should come as no surprise, for the offspring 
carries a shared ancestry. But the change of focus from teleology to archaeology is 
nonetheless hugely significant, since affirmation of the desire for the unity of human 
knowing is no longer reliant on the demonstration of (often artificial) claims of 
culminative sameness.3 As such, there is no need to, nor justification for, forcing faith and 
reason together in some kind of dubious epistemological hybrid in which one is almost 
inevitably made into a caricature of the other. Much better to allow each to maintain its 
distinctiveness even while being affirmed as an authentic expression of our common 
dwelling within the world.    
 
Peperzak’s Existential Archaeology of Thought 
Over the course of the last decade and a half, Adriaan Peperzak has published a series of 
volumes in which a quite distinctive account emerges of what I will refer to here as an 
existential archaeology of thought; a meta-narrative concerning the origins of both 
rationality and religious thought.4  
 
According to Peperzak, determinate religious belief (whether or not it follows a 
traditional creed) and rational reflection (regardless of its own structures and truth-
claims) both need to be understood thoroughly in the context of their rootedness in the 
                                                             
3 Such claims are akin to pre-emptive notions about the ultimate sameness of all religions; claims that – as 
any careful analysis will show – are at best inconclusive, most likely misleading, and often just plain false. 
4 Peperzak generally takes philosophy as he representative discipline of modern rationality. However, it 
seems to me perfectly consistent to extend this (as I do in this essay) to include all forms of rational thought, 
including the contemporary empirical sciences. 
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human condition. Specifically, both are ways of thinking and reflecting that are responses 
to the experience of finding ourselves in a more or less meaningful universe. To be 
existentially rooted in this sense means that both presuppose a certain confidence in the 
essential reliability of things that justifies our strivings and our taking a stand on matters 
of significance (whatever that stand might be in each case). This underlying confidence is 
a lived affirmation that marks all intellectual stances on the world – from conservative 
religiosity to vociferous atheism; from detailed empirical observations of the world to 
sweeping theories of reality – each of which involve interpretations of the situation 
within which individuals and communities find themselves (2005, 74-75; 1999, 122). 
Peperzak goes as far as to see this elemental lived confidence as indicating a basic sense 
of “faith”, a fundamental “hope” and “trust” in the meaningful coherence of the universe 
(2003, 4, 10, 155; 2005, 75; 2013, 116). Accordingly, all human intellection is rooted within 
this basic existential dimension of human life within which questions of “decisive or 
ultimate meaning” are mediated “at least tentatively and in an embryonic, albeit half-
unconscious form” (2005, 74). This is the “universal dimension, level or structure that can 
be found at the core of all forms or ways of life” (2005, 76), and thus all forms of reflection 
on the cosmos and the human place within it. It is out of this fundamental milieu that 
concrete theories of all kinds arise to give voice to this basic experience of the world.   
 
This is a bold thesis, and one which very deliberately looks to undermine rival accounts 
of the primacy or rightness of determinate religious, philosophical or scientific thought. 
In taking on both sides of the polarisation between systematic expressions of religious 
and rational thought (in claiming to have seen beyond the pretensions of both, to a more 
basic originality), Peperzak has opened up two fierce fronts. In this, he is aware of 
potential objections from both sides.  
 
First: the notion of primal ‘faith’ is a deliberate and devastating attack on the pretensions 
of philosophy to be an absolute and foundational discipline, and one on the basis of 
which other discourses are to be judged. For Peperzak, far from being a rival to faith, 
reason is in fact only possible on the basis of a prior “hidden faith” of its own (2005, 77). 
Reason is thus not basic: it is contingent upon, and derived from, deeper “pre-predicative 
and pre-propositional experience”; sources that are not themselves rational but are rather 
pre-rational, and even “affective” (2005, 75). To illustrate, Peperzak points to modern 
philosophy’s “infatigable questioning and self-critical requestioning”, something that he 
sees as betraying “a genuine desire of something greater than itself”, perhaps even to an 
intimation of “absolute transcendence”. After all, “from where does its passion for the 
truth come and what justifies its hope?” (2005, 81-82). In rejecting modern philosophical 
“autarchic” pretensions concerning its own primordiality (philosophy as kath auto; sui 
generis; causa sui), Peperzak at times mocks modern philosophy’s illegitimate declaration 
of independence referring to it at one point as the “religion of [the] Enlightenment” (2005, 
80).  
 
Peperzak is keenly aware of the potential for rebuke from rationalistic forms of 
philosophy (and the natural sciences) that he has illegitimately read faith-based claims 
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back into logic and the natural world. One might, for example, affirm the obvious point 
that philosophers philosophise (and scientists conduct research) out of particular life 
contexts, but that it is part of the professional rigour of such disciplines that personal 
subjective contexts need to recede into the background as the thinker puts forward 
arguments that need to pass the test of logical validity ( and/or evidential plausibility). 
Peperzak need not deny that on one level this is obviously the case. Nonetheless, it seems 
equally obvious that if the last century of hermeneutical epistemology (and philosophy of 
science) have shown anything, it is that claims to complete objectivity, in which the 
philosopher (or scientist) effectively disappear from the thinking process, are 
unsustainable. Science proceeds on the basis of hypotheses which are very human 
constructions built largely within existing paradigms, and which can only be rigorously 
tested after they have been formulated. Philosophy similarly proceeds on the basis of 
traditions of thought and individual intuitions that are the basis of rationally constructed 
arguments, a process that largely becomes obvious only in cases of stubborn and 
fundamental disagreement.5 Peperzak’s case is drawn from the familiar conclusions of 
twentieth century hermeneutics (and, one might add, work in the philosophy of science 
by thinkers like Kuhn and Polanyi). He illustrates the alternative via a parody: 
 
In order to separate their philosophy from their lives as they live them, 
philosophers must find a free-standing perspective outside their own worldly and 
historical existence. Only then can they form an objective and universally valid 
judgement about the universe, including their own functioning within it ... 
Thinking thus becomes the activity of an extra-existential, suprahistorical, 
superterrestrial thinker (2005, 77) 
 
The reality, he reminds us, is obviously very different. It is true that significant 
philosophical progress is made when philosophers appropriate our shared inheritance in 
new ways, thereby opening new possibilities for others. But it is terribly naïve to accept 
the notion that new philosophical systems really are simply creations “founded upon 
indubitable evidence and crystalline logic”. All philosophical contributions, even the 
great ones, “are rooted in some hidden faith, even when their authors are not aware of it” 
(2005, 77). Peperzak’s nod in the direction of the mysterious and indeterminate life 
context (indeed, the social and individual psychology) of philosophical (and scientific) 
practitioners can be understood as naming something of this vast inchoate reservoir from 
which rational thinking of all kinds arises.6  
                                                             
5 This is a matter on which I have written at length elsewhere. See Colledge 2014. 
6 Having said that, Peperzak does not help his cause, it seems to me, by his references to this fecund 
“existential” dimension of human life as “the religious dimension” (2005, 74; emphasis added). His 
justification for this “very broad definition of religion” is, to my reading, never sufficiently explained, for it 
is not clear why faith in this more elemental and existential sense needs to be associated with the religious 
per se, with the elemental religious dimension then having to be distinguished from “concrete (or 
‘positive’) religions” (2005, 74). Terminological confusions aside, there is also a significant risk here of a 
telling asymmetry forming according to which an ambiguous priority is afforded after all to the religious 
over the rational, where no such slanting is necessary. In what follows, I abstain from using this 
terminology which seems to me both unnecessary and incurring significant risks of misunderstanding. 
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Second: While writing as an unmistakably Christian philosopher, Peperzak’s view, it 
seems to me, should be understood as equally an assault upon determinate religious 
traditions insofar as they harbour their own foundationalist (literally fundamentalist) 
assumptions. This includes positions that insist on the originary primacy of concrete 
Christian theological truth claims (or those of any other tradition) as the starting point for 
all subsequent reflection  Far from being “properly basic”, particular concrete religious 
traditions are themselves responses to, and only possible on the basis of, a more 
immediate indeterminate experiential faith which is thereby given determinate and 
systematic doctrinal formulation.   
 
Peperzak recognises the grounds for protest from religious communities that he is at risk 
of reducing creedal faith to “existential categories that fit all human beings so well that 
religions in any normal sense of the word and the differences between religions no longer 
matter” (2005, 76). After all, to claim that concrete faith-claims arise out of a deeper 
experiential dimension, is to open the whole problem of the contingency of both one’s 
affective experience of the cosmos and of the tradition’s dogmatic interpretation of this 
basic human experience. Who is to say (and what possible criteria could one use to 
establish) which experience of the cosmos (and interpretation thereof) is the most 
adequate, worthy and faithful to the universe as it actually is? This is clearly a complex 
matter that goes to the heart of Peperzak’s broadly hermeneutic conception of theology 
proper, a topic that lies well beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
Nonetheless, Peperzak’s approach would indeed appear to be at odds with Christian 
doctrinal foundationalism. In the Augustinian/ Anselmic tradition, the faith is both the 
starting point and the content from which, and in the service of which, rationality seeks 
to provide understanding: fides quaerens intellectum. Thus any method which inverts this 
order of priority – which would assess faith on the basis of rational reflection – is a critical 
distortion.7 This conviction is widely attested across a range of Christian traditions, and is 
at the heart of the Reformed Epistemology movement (with its Calvinist roots) that has 
brought this view to the heart of contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. Unlike 
Peperzak, this variously articulated tradition of Christian fideism makes no 
differentiation between primal existentially-based “faith” and properly Christian 
doctrinal truth-claims. Only when the meaning of “faith” is stretched (or perhaps more 
accurately, changed) to take on an elemental existential rather than a dogmatic sense can 
faith seeking understanding be understood in the way Peperzak suggests.8  
                                                             
7 Such staunchly incompatibilist thinking is echoed in a very different context by Leo Strauss in his famous 
address on Jerusalem and Athens: “According to the Bible, the beginning of wisdom is fear of the Lord; 
according to the Greek philosophers it is wonder. We are thus compelled from the very beginning to make 
a choice, to take a stand. Where then do we stand? Confronted by the incompatible claims of Jerusalem and 
Athens, we are open to both and willing to listen to each ... Yet since we say that we wish to hear first and 
then to act or to decide, we have already decided in favor of Athens against Jerusalem (Strauss, 2011).  
8 In saying as much, I admit that across his various works Peperzak is not especially consistent with his use 
of the terminology of “faith”. A notable case in point is his 1999 text, Reason in Faith (the sub-title of which 
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In any case, against both angles of attack – from the rationalists and the religious 
traditionalists – Peperzak insists that his project is not interested in efforts to reduce either 
faith or reason to one another; nor to subjectivise them in any relativistic sense. His aims 
are much more modest. It is simply to insist on a common source for all concrete 
systematic thought as grounded in originary human experience. They are thus not 
relativised or undermined, so much as contextually affirmed.  
 
Engaging Peperzak’s Archeology of the Primal  
Peperzak’s writings are deeply informed by, and interlaced with, references to the history 
of western philosophy and twentieth century phenomenology. His sources and 
interlocutors are many. Before moving on, I wish to touch very briefly on aspects of the 
work of four figures who provide helpful contexts for further exploring this idea of a 
primal faith from which emerges both rationality and religion.  
 
A key source is Blaise Pascal, particularly those rich and oft quoted passages from the 
Pensées where he provides an account of the relationship between faith and reason. Of 
particular relevance here is Pascal’s notion of the role of “faith” (knowledge of the heart) 
in providing the “first principles” by which reason can then operate:  
 
The heart has its reasons, which reason does not know. We feel it in a thousand 
things … We know truth, not only by the reason, but also by the heart, and it is in 
this last way that we know first principles; and reason, which has no part in it, 
tries in vain to impugn them ... For the knowledge of first principles, as space, 
time, motion, number, is as sure as any of those which we get from reasoning. And 
reason must trust these intuitions of the heart, and must base them on every 
argument …  And it is as useless and absurd for reason to demand from the heart 
proofs of her first principles, before admitting them, as it would be for the heart to 
demand from reason an intuition of all demonstrated propositions before 
accepting them. (Pascal, 1968, n. 277, 282) 
 
While Pascal’s reference to “intuitions of the heart” is clearly intended to denote 
conviction of the presence and love of God (“This, then, is faith: God felt by the heart, not 
by the reason” (n. 278)), this elemental awareness is not to be confused with a 
systematically elaborated theological conviction which must, by definition, involve the 
application of reason. The “first principles” that are revealed by the heart are sensed by 
an immediate intuition which transcends both the senses and rationality. Further, Pascal 
is clear that it is these intuitions that are “properly basic” (so to speak), and which indeed 
are the foundations of all reasoning. They are not deductively derived, but are grasped all 
at once, inspiring immediate conviction.     
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                        
is “On the Relevance of Christian Spirituality for Philosophy”), where faith is often used in a specific sense 
to mean adherence to the Christian tradition.   
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However, while Pascalian intuitions of the heart are clearly not to be understood as 
determinate Christian theological claims, one is nonetheless left with a sense that what he 
has in mind has a certain proper form (if not ‘content’) that bears the marks of the creator. 
If this is so, then there is a nascent suggestion here of some kind of universal pre-rational 
experiential core that is the basis for all concrete knowledge. If this is so, then a range of 
familiar problems from the debates of early modern epistemology are raised. Is this 
knowledge of the heart innate (needing perhaps only to be recognised) or does it need to 
be acquired? If the former, why is it not generally recognised? If the latter, how does it 
come to be known? More recent lines of questioning might proceed as follows. Are 
(radically) different life experiences likely to induce (radically) different kinds of 
knowledge? Does one need to be formed in a particular way of thinking and being (e.g., 
within a particular religious tradition; or indeed through study of mathematics, science 
or philosophy) in order for the eyes of the heart to be opened to those things?  
 
These are real and difficult questions for interpretations that would posit a universal 
content for the primal ground of discursive thought. It is not clear, however, that 
Peperzak’s primal faith is of this kind. As instructive as the Pascalian background is for 
understanding what Peperzak has in mind, it seems to me that the most helpful points of 
reference are more recent.     
 
One such more recent interlocutor is Emmanuel Levinas, on whom Peperzak is, of 
course, a leading commentator. While Peperzak does not explicitly cite Levinas in this 
context, it is no accident, I would suggest, that it is Levinas himself who has provided one 
of the richest phenomenological descriptions of what Peperzak refers to as the “pre-
predicative and pre-propositional” dimension of human life. According to Levinas, “the 
non-intentional consciousness” lies prior to, or perhaps beneath, the reflexivity of 
consciousness that establishes the self-aware and free ego with its possibility of 
contrivance and projection of status.9 As such it stands before the other in utter 
vulnerability and openness: 
 
[T]he non-intentional ... has no intentions or aims, and cannot avail itself of the 
protective mask of a character contemplating in the mirror of the world a 
reassured and self-positing portrait. It has no name, no situation, no status …It has 
not yet been invested with any attributes or justified in any way (Levinas 1989, 81). 
 
Importantly, far from framing this elemental state as an early developmental stage which 
rapidly recedes with the onset of self-consciousness, Levinas emphasises that the non-
intentional “remains” (79) beneath the intentional overlay:  
                                                             
9 It is interesting that Peperzak prefers the term “pre-intentional” (which is more suggestive of Merleau-
Ponty and indeed Husserl) than it is of Levinas. To speak of the pre-intentional is to suggest a temporal 
orientation in relation to the intentional. The “non-intentional”, on the other hand, is entirely other to 
intentionality, and it is perhaps for this reason that it is generally preferred by Levinas. Nonetheless, the 
absoluteness suggested by utter “non-intentionality” is in some senses inconvenient for Peperzak, given his 
interest in the transition from indeterminate to determinate forms of faith. 
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Prior to any particular expression, and prior to all particular expressions which 
cover over and protect with an immediately adopted face or countenance, there is 
the nakedness and destitution of the expression as such ... This is the hidden 
human face behind perseverance in being…the affirmation of being (Levinas 1989, 
83, 85). 
 
The non-intentional is “prior” to all structures of intentionality which allow the positing 
of propositions that are the essence of determinate faith structures on one hand, and 
philosophical and scientific claims (the realms of fact and theory) on the other. As such, 
the sphere of the non-intentional might be characterised as the ultimate a priori; that 
elemental layer from which thought arises, and to which it – in some sense – returns. The 
priority of this elemental encounter with the world is thus a function of its humility: it is 
pure receptivity that is unadorned with justification or contention.  
 
On this basis, one might even suggest that the authenticity of conscious rational thought 
of any kind (be it religious or secular in nature) comes down to the faithfulness of the 
transition/ translation from elemental experience to determinate discourse and practice. 
One might perhaps suggest that this is the primary hermeneutic task: the movement from 
authentic subjectivity (defined here as a patient attentiveness to one’s elemental 
experience of being in the world) to the possibility of objectivity which, as Bernard 
Lonergan famously put it, is its fruit (Lonergan 1990, 292; also 265). Rationality comes too 
late to be the author of the basic intelligibility and meaningfulness of the world, or of its 
saturation with value. If these characteristics are not already present for us to be brought 
to the table of discursive thought, no amount of rational theorising can force them into 
existence.      
 
Other than the obvious Husserlian background, Levinas’ non-intentional is also 
substantially indebted to Martin Heidegger’s phenomenology of Dasein’s modes of being 
in the world, and Heidegger is clearly another major source for Peperzak. Of particular 
note here is Heidegger’s analysis of basic attunement (Befindlichkeit).10 Peperzak is keen to 
emphasise the “primarily affective character” of his notion of the elemental human 
domain, using explicitly Heideggerian language in speaking of “a fundamental 
attunement, a basic ‘mood’” (2005, 75; see Heidegger 1962, §29). With Heidegger, 
Peperzak would maintain that rationality is not sui generis, springing into the world as 
the beginning of all thought. Logic always has a context; its “metaphysical foundations” 
(to borrow from the title of one of Heidegger’s early lecture courses: Heidegger 1984) 
need to be understood in the context of Dasein’s being-in-the-world.  
 
                                                             
10 While I do not deal with this topic here, Peperzak’s phenomenological roots are also evident in his 
suspicion of the impoverished metaphysics of rationalistic and empirical scientific accounts of the world. 
Even while being highly critical of the Heideggerian and post-Heideggerian critique of onto-theology, he 
clearly accepts aspects of this critique insofar as western thinking about God has reduced the Divine to a 
definable term in a syllogistic game of chess (see Peperzak 2005, 98ff). 
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With Heidegger, Peperzak also emphasises the importance of distinguishing particular 
emotional states from the whole domain of affective attunement to the world: 
 
[O]ur affective response, rather than being a constellation of particular emotions, 
consists in a general and diffuse attunement that is so deep and permeating that 
often we are not even aware of it: a mood. We are in touch with the world by 
feeling ourselves involved in it, more or less at home or exiled, more or less at 
peace or struggling … [A] basic mood is the way in which we let the universe 
attune us (2005, 160).   
 
For Heidegger, as for Peperzak, this attunement – this affective basis for thought – has 
structure (of which his early thought looks to provide a phenomenology) but no 
universally instantiated content. In bringing our past with us, we experience the world 
differently. The whole structure of attunement is characterised by its factical nature; 
Dasein finds itself “assail[ed]” by moods (Heidegger 1962, 176), though which it is 
always already attuned to the world in inevitably idiosyncratic ways. Elemental human 
experience has a common structure to be found at the core of all forms or ways of life, but 
the character of this basic attunement will differ (sometimes dramatically) from individual 
to individual. The point is not that we basically experience the world in the same or 
similar ways (that would be ridiculous); rather that all thinking happens on the basis of a 
fundamental affective experience of living in the world. Indeed, given the differences in 
basic experience, one would expect that reasoned arguments in philosophy and theology, 
ethics and aesthetics, the natural and human sciences (and so on) would show great 
diversity in progression and conclusion. And so they do. Indeed, Peperzak’s suggestion 
that all such determinate rational and faith-based systems of thought are derivative of a 
more basic affective and experiential dwelling in the world provides a compelling reason 
for the vast and ubiquitous differences of judgement we see among religious and 
philosophical communities. It also goes quite some way to explaining what is at stake in 
incommensurable scholarly arguments that seem impervious to resolution through 
rational means (see Colledge 2014).  
 
Peperzak’s focus on the way in which our pre-intentional emotional attunement to the 
world speaks of an elemental faith or trust in the world is strongly echoed by William 
Desmond. In a passage that strikingly evokes Desmond on this theme, Peperzak put it as 
follows: 
 
The universe can inspire awe, admiration, gratitude, anxiety; we can feel 
threatened, safe, secure, content, frustrated, nostalgic, and so on … So long as we 
continue to live, however, there is always some sort of basic consent and trust, 
even if these are overwhelmed by anguish and temptations of despair. Somehow 
we remain attached to our existence and confident that it is better to be than not to 
be … Trust, confidence, or ‘faith’ … implies the affirmation that existence has an 
overall meaning ... This affirmation is lived rather than pronounced or thought. It 
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is the element of consent in our moods … ‘Faith is thus linked with hope (2005, 
75). 
 
Desmond’s work on the dynamics and affectivity of primal faith and its relation to 
determinate thought provides a perfect context for developing Peperzak’s own 
contributions to this field. Of primary importance here is Desmond’s notion of the 
“primary ethos” within which human beings fundamentally dwell, and which we then 
reconfigure in drawing up determinate and familiar ways of being. Desmond speaks of 
this (“properly basic”) context of our lives in various ways, such as the following: 
 
By ethos, I mean the ontological context or overdetermined matrix of value in 
which our human ethos and ethics come to be articulated. This is prior to, and in 
excess of, every ethical [and epistemological] determination that we define ... The 
ethos is not first revealed by thinking or by reflection; it is a happening before we 
make any firm difference between inner and outer, subject and object … [T]his 
pre-determinate ethos of value is not just ‘back there’ in an indefinite beginning, 
but is with us always (Desmond 2001, 17, 21, 22).   
 
For Desmond, recognition of this elemental context of being is essential, for without it we 
illegitimately see ourselves as creators of meaning, value and insight, which are in fact 
always derivative. This is an insight that he explores in a series of directions in his work, 
for it has metaphysical, ethical, aesthetic, psychological and theological implications.  
 
Desmond speaks of this basic idiosyncratic context of all personal being and thinking as 
“elemental idiocy” (in the Greek sense of idios, the private). This “elemental I” is 
“presupposed by all subsequently ‘constructed’ selves”. However, “this ’root’ is not the 
Cartesian ‘I think’, or any version of it. It is not a prereflective cogito. It is a prereflective 
idiocy, prior to all cogitos, and all determinate thinking” (Desmond 1995, 63). Paralleling 
Peperzak’s notion of the movement from the pre-intentional archē to determinate forms of 
rational and religious thought, Desmond is interested in the way that we move from this 
primary ethos to reconfigured forms out of which arise particular modes of determinate 
thought. Much is at stake in this reconfiguration of the primal ethos, by which we “stay 
true, betray or disfigure its promise” (Desmond 2001, 17). A paradigm case of the 
disfigurement of the ethos is what he sees as the devaluation of being in modernity: an 
epoch (which is in some ways still very much with us) in which the dominance of 
rational discourse and scientific method has often left philosophers with few tools with 
which to speak of the intrinsic goodness of being as such; of a cosmos already infused 
with value. In this way, the “primal ethos” in which we “live and move and have our 
being” is entirely overlooked and its derivative products (including all determinate forms 
of thought) are instead as regarded original.   
 
Much more might be said of the rich ways in which Desmond unfolds his analysis of the 
primal ethos and of his call for a return to a new attentiveness to its intimations in the 
context of life and thought. There is, for example, a closely related and strikingly 
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recurrent motif in his work of the stages of thinking relative to one’s relationship to this 
primal ethos: from the immediate joy of living (wonder, first innocence); the fading of 
wonder as the ethos is reconfigured; stages of despair through unfulfilled conatus; and 
finally the gift of renewed wonder (variously: “idiotic rebirth”, “agapeic rebirth”, 
“aesthetic recharging”), as something of the primal love of being in its basic goodness 
(the passio essendi) returns in a chastened and deepened sense (see Desmond, 1995, 256; 
2001, 380; 2008, 31-43, 118-121, 337). Despite everything, there can be a dawning of a new 
ontological faith (2001, 381, 508-09; 2008, 82, 121, 338-40;). This state of renewed openness 
to the gift and goodness of being – even in the midst of evil and suffering – seems to be 
what Desmond is gesturing to, wishing for, for the whole of western culture; and he sees 
philosophy as a discipline that needs to undergo its own transformation in order to play 
its part. A very similar trajectory is discernible in Peperzak’s own recent work.     
 
Religion and Philosophy as Modes of Determinate Discourse 
Given this discussion of the primal domain of experience and the derivative domains of 
thought that emerges from it, it remains to clarify the nature of the difference between 
concrete expressions of religious faith (particularly in creedal form) and philosophical 
(and/or scientific) reason. In what follows, Peperzak’s approach is brought into 
conversation with Greg Moses’ development of Jan Van der Veken’s distinction between 
faith and reason along the lines of the particular and the general.  
 
In dealing with the case of a Christian philosopher, Peperzak considers the switch of 
mode that occurs when conversing with those who do not share the same religious 
conviction. In such as case …  
 
he will look for common ground and shared assumptions in order to make 
discussion possible despite any fundamental differences. If we reserve the name 
‘philosophy’ for the level of universally shared assumptions, we abstract from all 
the real and possible differences in faith. Such a universally valid philosophy does 
not represent the concrete (and therefore existential) thought of its author, because 
it is only an abstract element of it (2005, 79-80).    
 
In this way, philosophy, for Peperzak, is “nothing other than the theoretical part of [the 
philosopher’s] existential endeavor” (2005, 79). This “theoretical part” is to be understood 
as that which is (in principle) intelligible to all people and not simply a concrete expression 
of the individual’s own intimate experience of meaningful dwelling in the cosmos. But 
against the claims of rationalistic philosophy, this theoretical mode of expression cannot 
be simply affirmed as independent and absolute, for to do so would be to uproot it from 
its elemental context. Reason itself is a doxastic practice every bit as much as determinate 
religious faith. But reason is a very particular kind of expression of faith: one that tries to 
speak in a language that is accessible to all.  
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Now it seems to me that Peperzak’s point feeds directly into the distinction that Jan Van 
der Veken makes (as related by Moses) between “what can be said about God on the 
basis of generally available experience, versus what can be said on the basis of particular 
experiences of particular people” (Moses 2004, 37). This is likened to “the knowledge that 
a perfect stranger might have of my good friend and the knowledge available to me as his 
or her good friend” (2004, 38). In both cases, what is at stake is an immediate familiarity 
or intimacy out of which one might speak (the particular), versus an abstract, theoretical 
and formal mode of knowing and speaking that seeks to find a place (so to speak) within 
the common domain (the general). Moses goes on to conclude that:  
 
the … distinction between faith and reason is not that of subjective versus 
objective, or non-rational versus rational, or supernatural versus natural, but more 
like, particular versus general, or even, as it will turn out, more particular versus 
less particular (2004, 39).    
 
In rejecting the standard objective/subjective, rational/non-rational, natural/ supernatural 
ways of understanding the faith-reason distinction, the pretensions of concrete 
philosophical, scientific or religious traditions to claim the role of the master discourse is 
undermined, for all are rooted in something far more elemental and primal which is the 
truly “properly basic” starting point of all determinate discourses. Theoretical discourses 
transform immediate and intimate elemental experience into concrete theoretical and 
reflective accounts typical of both theology and philosophy (as well as scientific 
discourses in their own way). This distinction maps perfectly onto Peperzak’s own 
distinction between derivative faith (i.e., concrete or “positive” religions) and derivative 
reason (such as philosophical enterprises).  
 
It is important to note that this approach entails a distinction between religious 
experience as such, and developed theological reflection which can be both individual 
and communal in nature (and which may then be distilled into highly formalised creedal 
form). As literally a logos concerning the Divine, a living theology is rooted in elemental 
experience and is a reflectively (and communally) distilled response to that experience. 
True, the distillation that occurs within religious traditions begins as a communal 
enterprise, and only with growing maturity does it looks to address the human condition 
in a more general way. To that extent, even concrete religious discourses retain a degree 
of particularity that is often in tension with an impetus to broaden its base to address 
humanity in more general terms (a tension accentuated by canonical and doctrinal 
conservatism).  
 
Nonetheless, vital philosophical reflection is also a product of reflective distillation, in 
dialogue with others, of the experience of dwelling within an overdetermined (meaning-
saturated, if deeply perplexing) universe. It is for this reason that Moses’ qualification in 
the quotation above – less “particular versus general”, than “more particular versus less 
particular” – is so important. It is crucial that reason – qua the general – is not understood 
to be free of any particularity, while faith is associated only with the particular, or even 
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the idiosyncratic. This would be to entirely undermine Peperzak’s (and Van der Veken’s) 
whole distinction. Further, the category of the “general” must not be taken to mean 
generally applicable or absolute, but rather simply as the commonly accessible. Rationality 
seeks to provide a common language and collection of methodologies – albeit is in ways 
that are perhaps largely constrained within the horizons of the western intellectual 
paradigm – by which people may communicate, but this is far from claiming it to be the 
master discourse as such. General means less particular, but particular nonetheless.  
 
In sum, both forms of discourse (the theological and the philosophical), if they are to 
retain their vitality, must remain rooted in elemental experiential soil, and both become 
empty abstractions as soon as that rootedness is lost. But, of course, the very process of 
transition (or distillation) from elemental experience to rational discourse involves both a 
loss as well as a gain. The very drive toward generality means that rationality is 
constrained in the range of insight and elaboration thereby open to it according to what 
can be thought and spoken within this mode. Thus, ironically, in abstracting experience 
from its native context, theoretical discourses can perhaps be equated as much with a loss 
of the absolute as its achievement. On the other hand, the great and important benefit of 
rational discourse is precisely the distance it is able to take on elemental experience in all 
its overwhelming immediacy, and thus the wider perspective and common clarity it is 
able to bring to reflection. Thus, while it lacks intimate affective-cognitive enmeshment in 
the primal experience, it instead contributes (literally) to the common sense.  While the 
immediacy and intimacy are lost, determinate discourses look to retain the formal 
structure of experience.  
 
Moses applies this point to rational and religious reflection on the experience of God: 
“The God of the philosophers may well be the same as the God who properly deserves 
the name, the God of the Religions, but only abstractly considered”(2004, 53-54). It is thus 
the role of reason – in this case philosophical theology – to provide a breadth and depth 
of perspective to the questions at issue. However, as one necessary step removed from 
the intimacy of a distinctively human confrontation with what is at stake in the question 
of God, reason alone is “incompetent to decide in any final fashion” or to “make religious 
choices for us” (2004, 56).  
 
What all this highlights, of course, is the complementarity of elemental faith and 
discursive reason in the realm of religious experience and thought. However, such a 
conclusion is now beyond any merely ‘tactful’ affirmation of mutual legitimacy, and is 
instead underpinned by a demonstration of the intrinsic belonging-together of faith and 
reason in their joint rootedness in the primal human experience of dwelling meaningfully 
in the cosmos.  
 
Conclusion: Faith, Reason and the Elemental 
I return to where this paper began: with the current state of the debate concerning the 
relative primacy of faith and rationality. What is clear, I would suggest, is the inadequacy 
of both incompatibilism and assimilationism in all their varieties.    
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Incompatibilist approaches (of whatever hue) are wrong to polarise the ways of reason 
and faith. On one hand, while distinct, philosophical and theological discourses are not 
mutually exclusive contraries, for the rational and the non-rational may be identified in 
each. Philosophy is not to be simplistically correlated with the rational; for as unable to 
ground itself, philosophy needs to face its own contingency and its rootedness in non-
rational and pre-philosophical sources. If the history of western philosophy proves 
anything, it is that attempts to refound philosophy on indubitable rational principles that 
banish all contingency, is lost cause. Similarly, determinate religious intellectual 
traditions cannot be simply associated with the non-rational, for they too seek to give 
concrete form to their contentions through the use of reason. 
 
But there is also much that should give us pause about assimilationist approaches to 
conceiving the faith-reason relationship. To be sure, there is much to affirm in the view 
that the unity of reality can be approached differently through a diverse range of thinking 
practices. Nonetheless, there remain important matters of assumption, methodology and 
perspective that separate the philosophical and religious domains. Philosophy (logos, 
albeit with its non-logical roots) and religion (mythos, albeit with its rational modes of 
articulation) need to be carefully – if not absolutely – differentiated. But just as 
importantly, they need to be understood in the context of their common roots in 
elemental human experience.   
 
 
***** 
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